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JURISPRUDENCE. By George C. Christie. St. Paul: West. 1973. 
Pp. xxxix, 1056. $18.50. 
Professor George C. Christie's compilation of jurisprudence 
readings and text is the first such book to be published by one of 
the major publishers of law-teaching materials in over a decade. 1 It 
may be viewed as a "program" for one familiar type of basic course 
iQ. jurisprudence-a course Christie himself offers and which he de-
scribes as "A historical examination of the development of legal 
philosophy from ancient times to the contemporary period."2 
Christie's materials consist mainly of extracts from writings of le-
gal thinkers ranging from Aristotle (384 B.C.-322 B.C.) (pp. 4-77) 
to Roy L. Stone (1923-1970) (pp. 1024-50). Most of the authors 
are Anglo-American and their work is arranged in historical se-
quence around what Christie calls basic themes: the beginnings of 
~egal philosophy (ch. one), the evolution of natural law thought (ch. 
two), the rise and development of positivism (ch. three), twentieth-
century legal realism (ch. four), modem analytical jurisprudence 
(focusing on Hohfeld) (ch. five), and the logic of legal reasoning 
from earliest times to the present (ch. six). Christie introduces each 
thmker with textual background material and provides lengthy intro-
ductions for major subdivisions. From time to time he appends 
questions after an extract and occasionally adds a note consisting 
mainly of critical comment. In addition to this material, a few court 
cases are provided. The compilation reflects vast labor and remark-
able conversancy with jurisprudential literature. Many instructors 
will find what they want inside these covers, at least for a basic sur-
vey course. 3 
I do, however, have misgivings about both the compilation and 
the nature of the course for which it is designed. I will state these 
1. It is noteworthy, too, that there is not a single article over the past decade 
addressed specifically to problems of teaching jurisprudence. Published discussion of 
those problems simply seems to have dried up. On the general state of research in 
the subject, see Summers, The Present State of Legal Theory in the United States, 
6 R.EclrrsnmoRIE - ( 1975) (forthcoming). 
2. DUKE UNIV. ScHOOL OF L\w, BULLETIN 43 (1973). 
3. Chapter one includes parts of Aristotle's The Politics and parts of his Nicho-
machean Ethics. Chapter two includes extracts from Aquinas, Hooker, Grotius, 
Pufendorf, Locke, Dabin, and d'Entreves. In chapter three, Hobbes, Locke, Hume, 
Austin, Grey, and Kelsen are represented, with Christie supplying a note on H.L.A. 
Hart. The fourth chapter has extracts from Holmes, Oliphant, Hutcheson, Frank, 
Llewellyn, and the Dane, Alf Ross. In chapter five, Christie takes up "Legal Analy• 
sis" and includes some of his own work along with that of Hohfeld. Chapter six, 
on legal reasoning from earliest times to the present, incorporates writings of Aris• 
totle, Bacon, Goodhart, Stone (Julius), Levi, Llewellyn, Stone (Roy L.), and 
Christie. 
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misgivings in a spirit of unfeigned humility, for I have no generaliz-
able answers, and I am not sure there are any. It is never easy to 
design course materials that will serve well in the hands of others 
and there are special difficulties when the subject matter is juris-
prudence. I will identify enough of them to indicate what Professor 
Christie was up against and to suggest why courses in jurisprudence 
are not widely elected in American law schools-why, indeed, the 
"Doctor of Jurisprudence" degree is, for many graduates, a misno-
mer. (This is not to say that jurisprudence can be taught only in jur-
isprudence courses.) 
There are at least eight problems that the designer of a basic 
course in jurisprudence must face. First, law students vary greatly 
in their theoretical sophistication and in their taste for theory as such. 
Yet the very idea of a basic course in the subject entails some stand-
ardization of offering. For student and teacher alike, this source of 
frustration can run deep. Second, students often acquire basic atti-
tudes and intellectual styles in their other law school courses that 
diminish their capacity to profit from even a good jurisprudence of-
fering. 4 Third, jurisprudential needs vary among law schools and 
even at the same law school from year to year. Of course, some 
faculties are better endowed intellectually than others. And some 
schools also have courses in "legal process," or in "law and society'' 
or the like. A "set" course, the general content and aims of which 
are more or less continuous from year to year (as in other subjects), 
may therefore be the wrong approach. Fourth, the intellectual at-
mosphere at some law schools is simply not a congenial one for a 
jurisprudence offering. 5 
Fifth, there is the problem of time. Course goals may justifiably 
vary with events of the day or era, but even with modem technology 
we cannot have a book a year. Consider these examples. If an 
epoch is marked by change and upheaval, the instructor may want 
to focus on the various mechanisms of change within a legal order-
on their distinctive utilities and limitations. Or, if the age uncrit-
ically accepts some general theory of value (utilitarianism, for ex-
ample), the instructor may want to stress the weaknesses of such 
a theory. If dogmatically held views be rampant (for example, "law 
always oppresses the masses"), he may wish to explore those views. 
Or, if recent political experience (such as "Watergate") suggests 
that the basic requirements of the rule of law are only dimly under-
stood, he may choose to dwell on some of those. The instructor thus 
responsive to time assumes a large responsibility. 
4. An oft-noted fact. See, e.g., Fuller, The Place and Uses of Jurisprudence in 
the Law School Curriculum, 1 J. LEGAL Eo. 495, 503 (1949). 
5. The phenomenon is not new: "Jurisprudence stinks in the nostrils not so much 
of the practicing lawyer as of the professional law teacher." Kocourek, Jurispru-
dence as an Undergraduate Study, 8 CALIF. L. RBv. 232, at 232 (1920). 
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Sixth, jurisprudence is rife with temptation, even for the rela-
tively self-disciplined. It is all too easy for instructors to convert the 
basic course into a research seminar in which they indulge their spe-
cial interests of the moment. Here there can be no standardization. 
Even a little thinking out loud from scratch will sometimes tum away 
law students, who are not notably tolerant of what may appear to 
be false starts. Seventh, jurisprudence, unlike contracts, administra-
tive law, admiralty, and virtually every other "basic course" in the 
law school curriculum, is not well supplied with published teaching 
materials compiled by leading lights, which can "save" the beginner 
or the middling teacher. This means, too, that there are few 
"models" for the compiler of new course materials. In jurispru-
dence, this is special cause for concern: the raw materials and the 
literature of the subject comprise an embarrassment of riches. In 
a sense, there are too many choices, too many considerations, too 
many ways to go awry. Finally (and this should hardly be surpris-
ing), jurisprudence is plagued more by pedagogical subjectivism 
than other subjects. 6 
Thus, Professor Christie had to labor against the odds. Even 
so, in some respects his effort may fall short of the attainable. Some 
of his goal statements are disappointingly vague. For example, he 
wants students to read "great legal philosophers" in order to "get 
a feel for the nature of their thought and the manner in which they 
develop their ideas" ·(p. xiii). Goals of this generality cannot orient 
students, let alone inspire or motivate them. Nor can they force the 
compiler of materials to focus on what ought to be taught and why. 
Other of Christie's goals are not only vague but, in my opinion, 
misconceived. He wants students to tackle the "core of thought in 
legal philosophy" because, he says, it "is presupposed by most seri-
ous contemporary jurisprudential writing" (p. xiii). Christie may 
mean that present writing "takes its problems" from what earlier 
thinkers have said. One is reminded of G. E. Moore's famous re-
mark: ''I do not think the world or the sciences would ever have 
suggested to me any philosophical problems. What has suggested 
philosophical problems to me is things which other philosophers have 
said about the world or the sciences."7 But if this is what Christie 
means, I doubt its truth. Contemporary writers in jurisprudence (at 
least in the United States) tend to take their problems not from what 
past thinkers have said, but directly from "raw materials" of the law, 
including current happenings in the legal world. 8 
6. Others have noted the subjectivism problem as well. See Konvitz, Book Re-
view, 17 YALE LJ. 160 (1939); Patterson, Book Review, 5 Mo. L. REv. 366 (1940); 
Rheinstein, Book Review, 17 U. CHI. L. REV. 422 (1949). 
7. THE PHILOSOPHY OF G.E. MooRE 14 (P. Schilpp ed. 1942). 
8. See, e.g., Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, in OXFORD EssAYS IN JuRISPRU• 
DENCE 202 (A. Simpson ed. 1973) (prosecutorial and other policies of Nixon Admin-
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Contemporary jurisprudential writing might be said to "presup-
pose" past writing in quite another sense: past writing might serve 
as a foundation on which all present work must build, if it is to be 
of real value, just as scientific research must build on existing scien-
tific knowledge. If this is what Christie means by "presuppose," the 
truth of his position is still not obvious. In contemporary writing 
on jurisprudence, building processes do sometimes occur, but just 
as often they do not. And they need not, for the work to be of 
significant value. Jurisprudential theorizing is not science. Good 
work can be done on problems of theory without immersion in any 
prior literature. 
But my ultimate quarrel with Christie's stated goal of exposing 
students to past writing "presupposed" by present writing goes 
deeper. For I believe that implicit in this goal are the research or-
ientations of an academic working in the subject. I do not believe 
that the teacher of a basic course should seek to equip students to 
do original work, even assuming that an immersion in history would 
do this. Nor do I think a basic course is the place for instructors 
to engage in extensive original research by thinking out loud from 
scratch. While students should be encouraged to think for them-
selves with respect to problems they encounter in the course, we 
should not expect professional contributions and should be wary of 
dilettantism. 
Professor Christie's goal statements lead inevitably to his choice 
of approach. A basic course might be organized around traditional 
problems, or around "schools" of thought, 9 or around several texts 
of "great thinkers." Christie adopts an "historical" approach, but 
I am skeptical that jurisprudence is suited to this treatment. Juris-
prudential theorizing, particularly about the nature of law, can be 
"epoch bound" and therefore irrelevant in important ways to later 
periods since the phenomena that are the objects of this theorizing 
may change, even fundamentally, from epoch to epoch. Thus, legal 
· forms of social organization in Aristotle's day (and even in Austin's 
day) were not the same as those of the present day. Accordingly, 
what Aristotle and Austin said when they set out to characterize the 
nature of law (assuming they got things right for their periods) is 
necessarily different from what a legal theorist should say about 
istration fail to take fundamental rights seriously); Greenawalt, A Contextual Ap-
proach to Disobedience, 70 CoLUM. L. REv. 48 (1970) (recent disobedience to vari-
ous American laws as stimulus); Summers, Evaluating and Improving Legal Proc-
esses-A Plea for "Process Values," 60 CORNELL L. REv. 1 (1974) (excesses of civil 
rights movements and of campus disruptions on one hand and "Watergate" on other 
as stimuli); Wasserstrom, On the Morality of War: A Preliminary Inquiry, 21 STAN. 
L REV. 1627 (1969) (Vietnam War). 
9. I once criticized the "schools" approach at some length. -See Summers, Book 
Review, 2 OrrAWA L. REV. 249 (1967). 
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Western legal systems today.10 Although we may still profitably 
read Aristotle on the philosophical problem of perception, the same 
is far less true of Aristotle on the nature of law. Furthermore, even 
where the underlying jurisprudential phenomena are sufficiently 
similar from epoch to epoch for an historical approach to be possible, 
this alone cannot guarantee its fruitfulness. The various thinkers 
simply may not have had sufficiently common concerns through time. 
One may have dealt with problem A, another M, and a third Z. 
Or, although each addressed the same problem, their common efforts 
may not have been sufficiently detailed or may have been on quite 
different levels. Such discontinuities afflict most topics within juris-
prudence at least until the time of Bentham and Austin at the end 
of the eighteenth century. 
Analogously, jurisprudential issues worthy of consideration in a 
basic course may not have any significant past histories in the liter-
ature, let alone roots in antiquity. Indeed, some issues are only to-
day being seen clearly. But the historically oriented compiler of 
basic course materials will be more or less inclined to omit or slight 
such problems. Professor Christie is no exception.11 
Above all, the historical origins of jurisprudential theories are 
generally irrelevant to ·their validity or soundness.12 It is generally 
of no importance who said what, when, and for what historical rea-
son. While the student might understand the intent and purport of 
a jurisprudential theory more fully if he also grasps its historical 
roots, 13 genetic investigation of ideas is notoriously difficult and is 
often sheer guesswork. One finds few instances in Christie's book 
where historical antecedents significantly illuminate the theory under 
consideration. A week's immersion in the relations of medieval 
church and state, for example, would throw light on the interpreta-
tion of Aquinas, but there is little time for this in a law school juris-
prudence course. A study of history can also enhance methodologi-
cal sophistication, but as I said earlier, it cannot be a prime function 
of a jurisprudence course to equip ordinary law students to do origi-
10. Consider, for example, the "technique" element in law, which I discussed in 
a preliminary way in Summers, The Technique Element in Law, 59 CALIF. L. REV, 
733 (1971). As late as Austin's time, two basic techniques of legal action, the ad-
ministrative-regulatory technique and the distributive technique, were not yet signif-
icantly developed, let alone perceived as such. 
11. Among the important problems that Christie neglects are modem theories of 
justice and utility as applied to the evaluation of laws and legal institutions, the inter• 
relations between law and social change, the limits of law's efficacy, "process values," 
and the "technique element in! law." 
12. For an extraordinarily suggestive general discussion of the possible relation-
ships between a philosophical discipline and its "historical" literature, see Williams, 
Philosophy, in GENERAL EDUCATION 160 (M. Yudkin ed. 1969). 
13. Possible "roots" include the ideas of earlier thinkers, the general intellectual 
climate of the day, contemporary social events, and a thinker's own education and 
background. 
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nal work in the subject. And even if it were, the few capable of 
it could acquire the sophistication more readily in other ways. 
Whatever approach is preferred, Christie's selections and format 
are subject to question. First, many would agree that jurisprudence 
really did not come of age in the English speaking world until 
Bentham and Austin. Not until Bentham did we get a systematic 
and purportedly comprehensive theory about how laws and legal sys-
tems should be qualitatively evaluated.14 And not until Austin did 
we get a detailed .theory about what law is and how it differs from 
related social phenomena.15 Yet Christie devotes half his materials 
to periods prior to Bentham and Austin when the subject was in its 
infancy. Moreover, today a great many law students, prior to law 
school, have already studied most of these materials in courses on 
political theory and the like. 
Second, to omit all works of Bentham in an historically oriented 
compilation, as Christie has, seems a sin. Bentham was the Aristotle 
of jurisprudence. He did more original16 work in the subject than 
any thinker working in the English language before or since.11 
Christie's failure to include more twentieth-century work is also dis-
appointing, especially when one reflects that half the book is devoted 
to materials written while jurisprudence was in its embryonic stage. 
He does, however, include a sprinkling of contemporary writings-
nearly all on legal reasoning.18 
Finally, like many before him, Christie implicitly invites students 
in the first several hundred pages to play the game of pigeonholing 
thinkers either into the "natural law school" or the "positivist" 
school. Students who take this seriously will, if they are perceptive, 
eventually see that these categories are not mutually exclusive and 
that they hide not one basic issue that supposedly divides all legal 
philosophers, but many different issues. The good students will see, 
too, that words such as "positivism" are used in many different 
senses, and they may well decide that a more particularized approach 
is preferable. But I fear that the average student may become pre-
occupied with pigeonholes rather than problems, with schools of 
14. See J. BENTHAM, AN lNTRODUCilON TO nm PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEG-
ISLATION (1870). 
1S. See J. AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (H!32). 
16. I use "original" to include "blocking out" relatively new problems as well as 
providing new "solutions" and developing new methods. 
17. Useful and readily accessible selections of Bentham's work may be gleaned 
from references in D. LYONS, IN THE INTEREST OF THE GOVERNED (1972), and from 
materials included in B. PAREKH, BENTHAM'S POLrrICAL THOUGIIT (1973). 
18. And here, Christie would have done well to include selections from the im-
portant writings of Dworkin and Hughes, work that is almost certain to last beyond 
that of Roy L. Stone (from whose work there are extensive selections at pp. 102S-
SO). See, e.g., Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 3S U. Cm. L. R.Ev. 14 (1967), re-
printed in EssAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 2S-60 (R. Summers ed. 1968); Hughes, 
Rules, Policy and Decision Making, 11 YALE LJ. 411 (1968). 
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thought, rather than thought, with classifications of theories rather 
than theories and their merits. 
My criticisms aside, Professor Christie's compilation is a welcome 
addition to available course materials. Historically minded in-
structors will find the book agreeable. My own skepticism might 
be influenced by my preference for an approach centering on juris-
prudential problems, but the book provides a selection of materials 
that is adaptable, perhaps with appropriate supplements, to this and 
other approaches. And instructors of any bent will find the compila-
tion a useful reference work. 
Robert S. Summers 
Professor of Law 
Cornell Law School 
